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OLIGOPSONY WITH FIXED MARKET SUPPLY
Leslie J. Reinhorn and Quinn Weninger

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes oligopsonistic price competition under a fixed input supply constraint.
Firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose input prices. A "highest offer first" allocation
rule determines each firm's share of the fixed supply. Under this rule, if a firm offers a particularly
low price, then it may be shut out of the market. Moreover, low offer prices cannot be sustained in
the market as a whole since firms have an incentive to outbid their rival(s) and increase individual
market share. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists if the number of competing firms is
sufficiently large. When this condition is satisfied, all equilibrium prices are near the firms'
marginal valuation of input: The market outcome is approximately Walrasian.

OLIGOPSONY WITH FIXED MARKET SUPPLY
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Introduction

This paper develops a model in which firms compete to purchase a fixed supply of an essential
input. For example, seasonal production in agriculture, regulated exploitation of natural
resources, and other government quotas can cause the short run supply curve to be effectively
vertical.! If buyers could collude they would offer no more than the sellers' reservation price.
We consider a case in which there is no collusion.
A simultaneous-move, non-cooperative game is presented. The choice variable for each .
firm is the price that it offers for the input. 2 A "highest offer first" (HOF) allocation rule
then determines how the fixed supply is allocated to buyers. Under the HOF rule, suppliers
actively seek the highest offer price for their product. Thus, high offer buyers satisfy their
demand first, leaving any residual for lower offer firms. We find that if the number of competing buyers is sufficiently large, then the game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which
J

the offer price is close to the marginal valuation of input: The equilibrium approximates a
Walrasian outcome.
The set of Nash equilibrium prices for the game is determined by balancing the tradeoff
between higher input costs and the possibility of an increase in market share. Over a range
of low offers, buyers have an incentive to outbid their rivals in order to increase their share
of the total supply (under the HOF rule). This incentive remains until the benefits from
outbidding rivals is offset by the costs of paying a higher price for marginal and infra-marginal
units. The flip side of this argument is that a firm can lower its input costs by offering a
lower price, but then market share shrinks. At the equilibrium price, there are no further
profit opportunities available from trading off price against market share.
Models of oligopsony have received much less attention in the economics literature than
ISee Adams and Haynes [1989]; Matulich, Mittelhammer, and Reberte {1996]; Rucker, Thurman, and
Sumner [1995]; Sexton and Zhang {1996].
2rr buyers compete in quantity (A la Cournot) rather than price, then the equil1brium price will equal the
sellers' reservation price.
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oligopoly.3 In part, this is because competition by buyers is naturally viewed as the mirror
image of competition by sellers. However, the market structure that we analyze competition by buyers who face a vertical supply curve -

price

does not have a natural analogue

in the oligopoly literature (price competition by sellers facing perfectly inelastic demand).
Rents will exist if demand exceeds the fixed supply at the sellers' reservation price. Sellers
are willing to accept any price above reservation, and buyers are willing to pay any price
below their marginal valuation of input. Within this range, high prices cause rents to flow to
sellers, and vice versa. Our results indicate that if the number of buyers is large then price
will be high and rents will flow to sellers. This is likely to affect the investment incentives
of both buyers and sellers, and it may also influence the decision to vertically integrate
(Grossman and Hart [1986]). This suggests an interesting relationship between horizontal
and vertical market structure. The extent of horizontal concentration will influence the
division of rents, which then affects the incentives for vertical integration.
The model provides a benchmark for assessing anti-competitive behavior in markets
/

wi th fixed supply. The recent dispute in the Bristol Bay (Alaska) salmon fishery is one
example. This fishery, and most others, fit the model since the supply of fish is completely
inelastic in the short run -

it is determined by biological factors as well as government

regulations. A $1 billion class-action lawsuit has been filed on behalf of approximately 5000
Bristol Bay fishers who claim that processing firms conspired to keep the price of raw fish
below competitive levels (Anchorage Daily News [1998]). This example identifies a need for
oligopsony models that can distinguish collusive from non-collusive behavior. Our model
takes a first step in this direction.
Section 2 presents the model and the HOF allocation rule. Section 3 defines and characterizes a Nash equilibrium for the model. Section 4 presents theoretical results regarding the
existence and qualitative features of equilibria. The results and model intuition are further
3A

quick search of EconLit confirms this.
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explored with an example in section 5. We identify the effect on equilibrium prices of changes
in various model parameters. Section 6 informally considers equilibria in which otherwise
identical firms differ in their offer prices. This section also briefly addresses the problem of
multiple equilibria and suggests possible equilibrium refinements. Section 7 concludes the
paper. Proofs are contained in an appendix.

Model

2

The input is a homogeneous product. The suppliers of this input have a common reservation
price

Wr.

They will not sell their product for any price less than

price the market supply curve is vertical at quantity
we will normalize

Wr

=

O.

Q>

O.

Wr,

but at any higher

To simplify the notation

This is equivalent to expressing all prices and all values as

differences from the reservation price. There are n 2:: 2 buyers that purchase the input in
an oligopsonistic setting. These firms compete by choosing offer prices

W

for the input, with

quantities determined by an allocation mechanism to be described below. The smallest unit
of account is denoted 8 >

o.

Thus, offer prices must be of the form m8 for some integer m.

The parameter 8 plays a significant role in the analysis of the model. A justification for
the existence of this smallest unit of account is in order. As a practical matter, most markets
seem to have an established 8. A familiar example is gasoline stations where 8 is one cent per
gallon (since prices almost always end with nine-tenths of a cent). An oligopsonistic market
which appears to have a well established 8 is the Alaska salmon fishery where the smallest
price increment for raw fish is a penny per pound.
To help understand this practice, consider an oligopsonist that wishes to attract new
suppliers. Clearly, this firm must increase its offer price enough to differentiate itself from
rival buyers. Infinitesimal increases would, in effect, be imperceptible to suppliers and hence
would not attract additional supply, but would increase costs. Thus, it seems reasonable to
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have a lower bound for price increases. What about price reductions? If the above argument
is applied to the case of price reductions, then a firm could lower its offer by a small amount
without losing any of its supply. This would result in an increase in profits. However, such
behavior is rarely observed. Perhaps suppliers would regard such tiny price reductions as
being in bad taste, much like cheating. If so, the firm would suffer a damaged reputation
and an eventual loss of suppliers.
An alternative line of reasoning is that firms are able to foresee the instability caused by
endless price adjustments. If so, market participants may choose to forego temporary profit
opportunities in favor of longer term stability. We shall not explicitly model such effects.
Rather, we simply assume that there is a lower bound 8 > 0 for all price changes, and that
suppliers are influenced by price differences as small as 8. 4
Let R(q) denote the maximized net revenue for a firm that has q units of input in its
possession (same R for all n firms).

That is, if the firm uses this input optimally and

maximizes profits in its downstream operations, then its net revenue is R( q) and its overall
/

profits are R(q) - wq , where w is the input price. 5 Assume that R is strictly concave and
continuously differentiable. Strict concavity of R implies declining marginal valuation for q.
For example, if R(q) denotes the maximized net revenue for a processing firm that faces
a constant downstream price for its value-added product, strict concavity of R obtains if
marginal costs are strictly increasing.
Let W(q) := R'(q). W(q) is the marginal increment to net revenue from the q'th unit of
optimally utilized input. From the above assumptions, it follows that W is continuous and
strictly decreasing. We shall also assume that 0 < W(O) <

00

and limqjoo W(q) < O. Let Q

4The exact value of the lower bound for price reductions plays no role in the analysis that follows. The
lower bound for reductions could differ from that for increases, but this would only complicate the notation.
5Recall that w is expressed as a difference from the reservation price W r , and R(q) is expressed as a
difference from wrq.
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be the inverse function of W: Q(W(q)) - q and W(Q(w)) - w. Then

R(q)

f W(~)~ - F
rW(O)

io

min{q , Q(v)}dv - F

where F is fixed costs. The equivalence between integration along the quantity axis and
integration along the price axis will be convenient for the analysis below. If w is the input
price then profits, R( q) - wq , are given by
rq

io [W(~) - w]d~ - F

rW(O)

=

io

min{q, Q(v)}dv - wq - F.

If w ::; W(q) then this last expression can be written as

2.1

J:(O) min{q, Q(v)}dv - F.

"Highest offer first" (HOF) allocation rule

Given that the total quantity of input is limited in supply, there must be some allocation
rule to determine the actual quantities purchased by each firm. If input suppliers actively
seek the highest price for their product, then it seems reasonable to assume that the firm
with the highest offer price gets to purchase its desired quantity first. Any remaining supply
will then be sold to the firm with the second l:lighest offer price, and so on until the fixed
supply is exhausted. Each firm pays its own offer price for the quantity that it actually
purchases. Hence, each firm faces conflicting objectives. If it offers a particularly low price,
then according to the HOF rule it may be shut out of the market. On the other hand, if
it offers a particularly high price, then it will secure ample market share but will face high
input costs and low profits. The HOF rule makes this a strategic decision. Each firm's offer
price is influenced by its perception of the offer prices of all other firms.
The HOF rule is defined formally as follows . Consider the price vector w
where

Wi

= (WI, W2, ... ,wn )

is the offer price of firm i. The first step is to order these prices from lowest to

6
highest. To simplify the notation, assume that

i=l, ... ,n-1.
The description of the rule begins with the special case in which all prices are distinct:

i=l, ... ,n-1.
Then the HOF rule dictates that the actual quantities purchased by each firm are

n

qi = max{q E [O,Q(Wi)] : q+ ~ qj::;
j=i+1

Q} =min{Q-

Now consider the case of ties. Suppose firms i, i

+ 1, ... , j

n

~ qj,Q(Wi)}

i

2: 1.

j=i+1

all offer the same price:

If i = 1 (j = n), one can ignore Wi-1 (wj+d in the above expression. Then the HOF rule
dictates that the actual quantities purchased are
n

qi = qi+1 = ... = qj

=

max { q E [0, Q( Wi)]

(j - i + l)q + ~ qk::;

Q}

k=j+1
=

min { (j - i

+ 1) -1 . (Q -

n

~ qk), Q (Wi) }.
k=j+1

Firms involved in a tie will purchase their full desired quantity Q(Wi) if it is available;
otherwise they will share equally and exhaust the residual supply. 6
6The uniform rationing rule (Kreps and Scheinkman [1983]) and the random rationing rule (Allen and
Hellwig [1986]) have been developed to model competition for consumer market sales under capacity constraints. Stahl [1988] develops a "winner-take-all" rationing rule to model competition between merchants
for upward sloping input supplies. Under the winner-take-all rule, the high offer buyer is obliged to purchase
the entire quantity supplied at that offer price. Quantity supplied is split equally in the case of an offer price
tie. By contrast, under the HOF rule a buyer may outbid its rivals without fear of being forced to purchase
the entire quantity supplied. This seems more reasonable for markets in which buyers' demand curves are
downward sloping.
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The HOF rule defines a mapping Q* from price vectors w into quantity vectors q = Q*(w).
This induces a mapping from prices to firms' profits. When the price vector is w, firm i's
profits are given by

l

W (O)

Wi

min{qi,Q(v)}dv-F

where qi is the i'th entry of Q* (w ).

3

Equilibrium

3.1

Definitions

We proceed by characterizing the short-run offer price equilibrium of the game. That is, we
suppose that fixed costs have been sunk and each firm chooses its offer price to maximize

J3 [W(()
i

- wi]d(. A brief discussion of entry and exit in a long run market equilibrium is

presented at the end of section 4 below.
For each buyer, the set of pure strategies is finite - offer prices must be of the form m8
for some integer m and 0

~

m8

~

W (0). Offers that lie on this price grid will be referred

to as feasible. It immediately follows that a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies must exist
(Nash [1950]). However, our focus will be on pure strategies.
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a vector w of feasible offer prices that satisfies the
following condition. For any i = 1, ... ,n and for any feasible 11\,

A symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium in which all firms offer
the same price:

Wi

=

w for all i.7

For a symmetric equilibrium, the HOF rule yields

7In this case, the same symbol w will be used for both the n-tuple and each of its entries. It should be
clear from the context whether the reference is to the vector or the scalar.

/

8
qi

= q = min{Q/n, Q(w)} for all i and
IIi(W) =

rW(O)

Jw

-

min{Q/n, Q(v)}dv - F.

It is clear that all n buyers unambiguously prefer those symmetric equilibria with the lowest
values for w. Conversely, the input suppliers prefer just the opposite (provided the price is
not so high that there is excess supply).
Symmetric equilibria are appealing since they avoid the inequity that would result if
some suppliers were able to sell their product for a higher price than others. For this reason,
the analysis that follows will be devoted primarily to symmetric equilibria, though section 6
will briefly consider the asymmetric case. In order to characterize symmetric equilibria, it
is necessary and sufficient to consider deviations from w by anyone firm since all firms are
identical. This analysis will be divided into two separate cases: deviations above wand
deviations below w.

3.2

Characterization and discussion

/

Consider deviations above a candidate equilibrium, w. If firm 1 were to offer WI > w, then
the HOF rule yields

iiI = min{Q, Q(wd}, and III(W) = J:(O) min{Q, Q(v)}dv -

this is a decreasing function of WI, it follows that max{III (w) : WI > w & Wi =
occurs at WI = w

+ 8.

W

Vi

i= 1}

Thus, in order for w to be a symmetric equilibrium it is necessary

that8

l

F. Since

W (O)

w+b

-

min{Q, Q(v)}dv ~

l

W(O)-

min{Q/n, Q(v)}dv.

(1)

w

Lemma 1 in section 4 below will demonstrate that (1) defines the lower bound to the
set of symmetric equilibria. This lower bound is determined by the price at which the
increase in market share from a higher offer ceases to offset the additional costs that must
be paid on marginal and infra-marginal units of input. The situation is shown graphically in
81£ w

+ b > W(D)

then there are no feasible offers Wl > w, so (1) holds vacuously.

figure 1. Consider the case where each firm is currently offering the price wand purchasing
the quantity

Q/ n. If a firm deviates up from

w to w

+ 8, it distinguishes itself as the high

offer buyer and is able to expand its market share. This leads to a net revenue gain of

R(Q(w + 8)) - R(Q/n), which is represented by B + C + D in the figure. The additional
costs include the price increment that must be paid on all infra-marginal units (A) plus the
total cost of new purchases (C -+ D). The net change in profit is B - A. In order for w to
be a symmetric equilibrium, B must not exceed A. The figure indicates that larger values
of w lead to reductions in B without affecting A. This suggests that (1) will be satisfied if
w is sufficiently large. Lemma 1 will formalize this argument by identifying a threshold w;;

such that w satisfies (1) if and only if w

~

w;;.

Consider deviations below a candidate equilibrium. If firm 1 offers WI < w, the HOF
rule yields iii = min{Q/(n - 1), Q(w)} for i ~ 2 and iiI = min{Q - (n - 1)ii2, Q(wd}. Then
III(W)

= J:;(O) min{iiI, Q(lI)}dll -

F. Therange of integration is decreasing in WI' Also,

since Q (WI) is a decreasing function of WI, it follows that iiI is a non-increasing function of
WI' This implies that the maximum of {III (w) : WI < w & Wi =

W

Vi

i=

I} occurs at

WI = O. Thus, in order for w to be a symmetric equilibrium it is necessary that
(W(O)

Jo

min{ ii, Q(lI) }dll ~

where ii = min{Q - (n -1)ii2,Q(0)} and ii2

lW(O)w

min{Q/n, Q(lI) }dll

(2)

= min{Q/(n -l),Q(w)}. These conditions on

ii can be combined:
Q-(n-1)Q(w) ~O

o~

Q - (n - l)Q(w) ~ Q(O) => ii = Q - (n - l)Q(w)

Q(O) ~ Q - (n - l)Q(w)

(3)

=> ii = Q(O).

A downward deviation has two counteracting effects on the net profits of the firm. Clearly,
dropping the offer price leads to a reduction in input costs. However, the HOF rule dictates
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that low offers are filled last which suggests the possibility that downward deviations can
lead to a significant decline in market share. Referring to figure 2, we compare the profits
at an offer price of wand at an offer price of O. When all firms are offering w, the supply
constraint is binding and each obtains quantity Qjn and profits A + C. When a single firm
drops its offer, its rivals satisfy their demand first and increase their supply to the minimum
of Q(w) and Qj(n - 1). This increase multiplied by n - 1 gives the total increase in rivals'
supply which must equal the decrease in supply to the low offer buyer. Residual supply is

q which will tend to be small when n is large. The deviator's profits are A + B. Deviating
down will not pay when the decline in market share is sufficiently large to offset the benefit
from purchasing at the sellers' reservation price -

when C exceeds B. The figure seems to

indicate that this condition will be satisfied if w is small. However, since

q is itself a function

of w the argument is incomplete. Lemma 2 below fills in the details.
The set of all symmetric equilibria is characterized by feasibility, condition (1), and
condition (2) with

q defined in (3).
.I

4

Results

Our main result is proposition 6 which states that a symmetric Nash equilibrium must exist
if the number of firms, n, is sufficiently large. FUrthermore, when n is large the equilibrium
price w approaches the firms' marginal valuation of input. Thus, rents will tend to flow to
the suppliers, not the purchasers, of the input. We reach this result through a sequence of
lemmas. First, lemma 1 describes the set of all w values that satisfy (1).
Lemma 1 There exists

w;;

~

0 such that (1) is satisfied if and only if W E [w;;, W(O)].

If 8 ~ W(O) or if nQ(8) ~ Q then

w;; <

W~+l'

That is, either

w;;

=

O. If

w;; > 0 then w;; < W(Qjn) - 8 and

w;; is equal to zero for all n, or else it becomes positive for

some n, and thereafter it is a strictly increasing function of n. Finally, if 8 < W(O) then

11

limn -+ oo w;;

= W(O) - 8.

This lemma places a lower bound w;; on the set of possible symmetric equilibrium prices.
(Note that w;; need not lie on the grid of feasible offer prices.) FUrthermore, this lower
bound is a strictly increasing function of n, at least when 8 < W (0) and n is sufficiently
large. This immediately implies that if the number of firms is large, and 8 is small relative to

W(O), then it will be impossible for these firms to keep their offer prices low in equilibrium.
Section 5 uses an example to address the issue of how large n must be.
The next three lemmas describe the values of w that satisfy condition (2).

Lemma 2 There exists w: < W(O) such that (2) is satisfied if and only if w E [0, w:]. If

Q ~ nQ(O) then w: =

o.

Otherwise, w: >

There is an upper bound

o.

w: < W(O) to the set of possible symmetric equilibria.

next lemma provides some information regarding the value of

The

w; .
/

Lemma 3 SupposeQ<nQ(O). Definew:asinlemma2. ThenQ/n<Q(w:) <Q/(n-1).
If n is relatively large and if the demand curve Q(w) is relatively elastic,
provides rather stringent bounds on
at

w= w:.

w;.

Let

E

th~n

lemma 3

denote the (absolute value of the) elasticity

Then

o<

W(Q/n) - w; ~ Q(w;) - Q/n <
w~
EQ(W:)

!

(1 _

E

Q/n .) = ~ .
Q/(n - 1)
En

The extent to which w: can differ from W(Q/n), in percentage terms, is limited by the
number of firms and by the elasticity of demand for input. 9
9This bears some resemblance to familiar results from Cournot competition. Specifically, in a Cournot
oligopoly with n identical firms, any symmetric equilibrium satisfies (P - Me)/ P = l/{in) where P is the
equilibrium price of output, Me is marginal cost, and i is the elasticity of market demand. For a Cournot
oligopsony with n identical firms, the analogous result is (MRP-w)/w = l/{ln) where w is the equilibrium
price of input, M RP is marginal revenue product, and l is the elasticity of market supply.
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The following corollary uses the previous two lemmas to prove an interesting result. If
Q < nQ(O) then for any symmetric equilibrium the offer price w will fall short of the marginal
valuation of input W (q), where q is the quantity purchased by each firm. Pricing will not
be Walrasian, though the gap W (q) - w could be very small.
Corollary 4 If Q < nQ(O) then in any symmetric equilibrium with offer price w, each firm

purchases q = Qjn units of input and w < W(Qjn).
The next lemma addresses the effect of n on the upper bound
Lemma 5 Define w;; as in lemma 2. If w;; > 0 then w;; <

w;;+ l '

w;;-.
Also, limn~oo w;;-

=

W (0) .

In order for a price w to be a symmetric equilibrium it must satisfy 3 conditions. First,
it must lie on the grid of feasible offer prices. Second, it must satisfy (1). By lemma 1,
this is equivalent to w E [w;;, W(O)].

Third, it must satisfy (2).

By lemma 2, this is

equivalent to w E [0, w;;]. Clearly, in order to satisfy these last two conditions it is necessary
./

that

w; ::; w;;.

In general, this inequality cannot be verified unless parameter values and

functional forms are fully specified. However, if n is sufficiently large and if 8 < W (0) then
the results regarding the limiting values of w;; (lemma 1) and

w;; (lemma 5) can be used to

establish the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 6

(a) If Q > nQ(O) or if 8 ~ W(O) then w

= 0 is the unique symmetric equilibrium price.

(b) If 8 < W(O) then there exists N and there exists w* E [W(O) - 8, W(O)) such that for
each n

~

N, w* is the unique symmetric equilibrium price.

Part (a) of the proposition deals with two cases that are of little practical interest. If

Q

~ nQ (0) then the supply of input is so plentiful that it is a free good.

If 8 ~ W (0)
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then the only feasible offer priceB are 0 and perhaps W(O). Part (b) not only eBtablishes
the existence of an equilibrium price, it also reBolves an issue that corollary 4 left open.
The corollary demonstrated that (if

Q < nQ(O)) equilibrium priceB cannot be Walrasian.

But it did not determine the size of this gap. The proposition, however, does provide this
information, at least for

71,

2: N. The equilibrium price w* must satisfy W(O) - 8

w; < W(Q/n) < W(O) where the third inequality follows from lemma 3.
o < W(Q/n) -

w*

~ w* ~

Thus, for n 2: N,

< 8: The equilibrium price differs from the competitive price by leBS than

the minimum price increment.
One topic that has not been addressed is profitability. The model allows for the possibility
that firms face fixed costs. If 71, is large then not only dOeB the input price almost equal the
buyers' marginal valuation of input, but also quantity Q/n is small. In this case, fixed costs
would have to be quite small in order for the equilibrium to be sustainable. Otherwise, some
firms would exit the industry and it would be necessary to analyze the characteristics of
equilibria for small n.

5

Example

This section preBents an example to further illustrate the role played by model parameters.
We explore the impact of the number of firms, the fixed market supply, and the slope and
intercept of the firms' marginal valuation function on the existence of equilibrium priceB. We
are also intereBted in the deviation of equilibrium priceB from firms' marginal valuation of
input since this indicateB the extent to which priceB are non-Walr as ian. For this example, let

R(q)

=

Pkq - C(q) - F, where P is the exogenous consumer price, k :::; 1 is a constant waste

coefficient, C(q) = aq2/2 is variable costs, and F is fixed costs. Then the buyers' marginal
valuation of input is W(q) = R'(q) = Pk - aq.
With theBe functional forms, it is possible to compute the outcome of the oligopsonistic
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game as n vanes. Specifically, we calculate the lower and upper bounds of the equilibrium
set as defined in lemmas 1 and 2:

w;;

and

w;

respectively. We also calculate the firms'

marginal valuation of input which allows us to compare equilibrium and Walrasian prices.
It is straightforward, though tedious, to verify that when Pk > 0 the following holds. If

Pk - 0 2:: o:Q and 211,0 2:: (11, - 1)20:Q then w;;
Otherwise,

w;

Pk - no/(n -1) - (11, + 1)o:Q/(2n)}.

w;; = max{O, Pk - 0 - o:Q/n - V20:Qo/n}. Also, if Pk - o:Q/n

= O. Otherwise,

():=

= max{O,

w;

=

¢/(n - 1) where ¢

:=

nPk - o:Q

+ o:Q/[n(n -

S; 0 then

v'e

1)] -

and

(Pk+o:Q/[n(n-1)])2 - (11,+ 1)(o:Q/n)2/(n-1). These formulas are somewhat difficult

to interpret, so we shall proceed by choosing particular parameter values and computing the
outcome. Before we do so, one final analytical result is of interest. One can show that if

2no/(n-1)2 S; o:Q S; 2no(n-1)2 then a pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium exists. 10
This condition will be satisfied if n is large relative to the other parameter values.
The numerical results are shown graphically in figure 3, cases 1-4. In each case, we set

k = 0.9, F = 0, and 0 = 0.01. We vary
The values assigned to P,

Q,

11"

and W'(q) =

the number of firms in the market, from 2 to 8.
-0:

are listed for each case in the figure.

For all cases, there is a threshold value of 11, beyond which symmetric equilibrium prices
exist, and these prices rise with n. Larger n implies a smaller market share for each firm. A
smaller quantity per firm reduces marginal cost and permits higher offers. This creates an
inverse relationship between market concentration and equilibrium prices -

an interesting

result since collusive agreements may also have this property.
Case 1 is our benchmark. The parameters are set at

Q=

500, P = 1, and

0:

= 0.002.

Each of the remaining cases will change one of these values, leaving the others fixed. It is
easy to determine from the figure which market structures support an equilibrium. In case 1,
w~

lies below

w;;

for n

= 2,3

but rises above

w;;

for 11, 2:: 4, and since.the gap is larger than

Pk - 6 - aQ/n - -/2aQ6/n ~ 0 then w;i - w;; > 6, while if this condition is not satisfied then w
is an equilibrium.
IOIf

=0
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8 = 0.01 equilibria exist.
In case 2, P is reduced from 1 to 0.6. This causes a vertical shift of the firms' marginal
valuation function. l l Note that fewer firms are needed to support an equilibrium when P is
decreased; an equilibrium exists for all n
in both W(Q/n) and

w;;

(as long as

~

w;;

2. The decline in Pk causes a one-for-one decline
~ 0). However,

w:

does not decline by this full

amount since the incentive for a deviator to offer a price of zero is inversely related to the
initial price.
In case 3, the market supply is increased to

Q = 1000. When n = 2,

w

= 0 is the unique

equilibrium price since the increased supply exceeds market demand at every price. For all
larger values of 11" equilibria with positive prices exist. Note that these equilibrium prices are
lower than in case 1. If market supply is larger then for each n buyers will face less rationing
under the HOF rule. This reduces their incentive to outbid one another.
Case 4 explores the effects of a steeper marginal valuation function (n
libria exist for all n although the unique equilibrium price is zero for n

=

= 0.005). Equi2. At n

=

3 the
/

equilibrium prices are zero and 8. For n

~

4 all equilibrium prices are strictly positive. This

result is intuitive. If the marginal valuation curve is steep, firms' demand for input is not
particularly sensitive to price reductions. When price is zero, the combined demand of a
small number of firms will not be sufficient to absorb the fixed supply. But if

11,

> 3 the

cumulative demand at w = 0 exceeds supply and zero can no longer be an equilibrium price.
The existence of strictly positive equilibrium prices for all n > 2 is also quite intuitive since a
steep marginal valuation curve implies rapidly rising marginal costs. Were a firm to deviate
and raise its offer price, it could claim the entire market. However, with sharply rising costs
this move is less likely to be profitable. This reduces the incentive to raise price and it keeps
the

w;; curve low.

11 Since all prices are measured as deviations from the sellers' reservation price
shift is equivalent to an increase in W r . See footnote 5.

Wr,

this parallel vertical

16

In all four cases equilibria exist even when the number of buyers is very small. Although
this depends on the specific parameter values that were chosen, recall that an equilibrium
must exist if 2n8/ (n -1) 2

::;

nQ ::; 2n8 (n -1) 2 . FUrthermore, with a linear marginal valuation

function the rate at which the w;; curve approaches W(Q/n) - 8 is of order 0(n- 1/ 2 ), and
the rate at which the

w: curve approaches W(Q/n) is of order 0(71,-2.). This provides further

evidence that as the number of buyers increases there is rapid convergence to conditions that
support symmetric equilibria. That is, since

w: rises toward its limit at a much faster rate

than does w;;, as n increases the market will move rapidly toward satisfying the sufficient
condition

w: - w;; > 8.

Finally, we discuss the effect of a change in 8, the minimum unit of account.
parameter has no effect on either W(Q/n) or

w:.

However,

w;;

This

is a decreasing function of

8. (See the formula above.) A smaller 8 means that the benefit from being the high offer
firm and choosing quantity before rivals can be achieved at lower incremental cost. The
point at which it no longer pays to become the high offer firm, w;;, lies closer to the firm's
marginal valuation of input. The extent to which a decrease in 8 shifts w;; up is more than
one-for-one, though the magnitude of the shift is a decreasing function of n.

6
6.1

Asymmetric equilibria and equilibrium refinements
Asymmetric equilibria

In general, we cannot rule out the possibility of asymmetric equilibria. The nature of such
equilibria may be partially characterized as follows. Let w denote an equilibrium price vector,
and q = Q* (w) the corresponding quantity vector. First, note that all firms, including the
lowest offer firms, must have qi >

o.

A firm with zero market share would have to fully

absorb its fixed costs, whereas it could always offer a high enough Wi < W(O) to ensure
positive market share and an increase in profits.
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Second, in any equilibrium the difference between any two offers cannot exceed 8. To
prove this, we assume that two offers differ by at least 28 and show that this cannot be an
equilibrium. Since the lowest offer firm(s) must have positive quantity (previous paragraph),
the HOF rule tells us that all firms with higher offers must fully satisfy their desired demands.
In this case a firm with the highest offer could lower its price by 8 and strictly increase its
profits. This firm would not lose market share: Any remaining firms with the highest offer
have no desire to increase their market share, and if any firms were already offering 8 less
than the highest offer they might have to share their larger quantity with the firm that
deviates. With a lower price per unit, and no decline in quantity this firm's profits must rise
so

W

could not have been an equilibrium. Asymmetric equilibria may exist, but the extent

of the asymmetry in prices is quite limited.

6.2

Equilibrium refinements

Proposition 6 establishes the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium under specified
conditions. The example in the previous section indicates that there may be other conditions
under which multiple symmetric equilibria exist. Additional criteria are available to offer
insights into which of these equilibria is most likely to emerge in the market. For simplicity,
suppose there are two symmetric equilibrium prices:
Wi

+ 8 ~ wt.

Buyers clearly prefer

Wi

to

Wi

<

and

Wh

=

it may be the case that

Wh

is

Wh,

with

W;;' ~ Wi

Who

Note that while buyers would prefer to coordinate on

Wi

risk dominant in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten [1988]. To see this, suppose firms cannot
precommit to

Wi.

Then each must consider the possibility that others will offer Wi or

Who

In

so doing, each firm is concerned that it may be costly to make a wrong guess regarding the
actions of others.
While the actual outcome of the game depends on the specifics of the buyers' marginal
valuation function and other parameters, an informal discussion can provide much of the

/
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intuition. Consider the decision that firm i must make. If this firm believes that

WI'.

will be

the outcome, then it will offer this price. But if this belief were wrong and several other
firms were actually offering

Wh,

then under the HOF rule firm i would likely receive a small

market share and small profits. Such a mistake could be extremely costly. Firm i could
protect itself against this scenario by offering
since it could also be costly if firm i offers

Wh

Who

The argument is not complete, however,

when some other firms are offering

WI'..

In this

case the HOF rule would provide firm i with substantial market share, but at the cost of
paying the high offer price. Though if 8 is relatively small this cost will also be quite small.
This leads us to suggest that if firm i is concerned about the risks of guessing wrong, then it
may be led to offer
that

Wh

Who

Since each firm faces the identical problem, there is reason to believe

will be the actual equilibrium outcome even though all firms would be better off if

they could coordinate on Wi. More generally, if the model admits more than two symmetric
equilibria, the risk dominance criterion may direct firms to the highest of these prices, which
suggests that price will be close to buyers' marginal valuation of input.
/

7

Extensions and conclusion

This paper analyzes oligopsonistic price competition in a market with a vertical supply
curve. In the model, buyers simultaneously and independently choose offer prices. A highest
offer first (HOF) allocation rule determines the supply of input for each buyer. Conditions
under which a Nash equilibrium exists are identified and characterized. When the number of
competing buyers is large, a symmetric equilibrium exists in which the common offer price
is very close to the marginal valuation of input. As indicated by the example in section 5,
this is likely to remain true with a smaller number of buyers.
A vertical supply curve generates quasi-rents that must be divided between buyers and
sellers. If buyers could collude they would lower their offers to the sellers' reservation price

19
and extract all the rents. In our model with price competition there is a tendency for this
result to be reversed. Buyers bid the price up as they compete for market share and this
causes rents to flow to sellers.
The model offers suggestions for applied research into collusive behavior in oligopsonistic
markets. If the data for a given industry are consistent with the model studied here, this
would provide some evidence against the presence of collusion. In order to conduct such a
study, it would be necessary to gather data on all of the model's key variables. For instance,
changes in market supply, number of firms, and buyers' marginal valuation of input all have
an impact on both market price and the distribution of rents between buyers and sellers.
A change in price or a shift in the distribution of rents may result from changes in market
conditions and is not necessarily evidence of collusion.
The static game may provide insights into the outcome of a dynamic extension in which
the same group of buyers repeatedly face each other in price competition. The set of static
N ash equilibria defines the bounds of punishment that may be imposed in a game of tacit
collusion. Buyers are able to maintain a low price only to the extent that a deviation would
be punished by higher prices in the future. Since the punishment price could cause most
rents to be transferred to sellers, it may be possible to support substantially lower prices in
a repeated setting. This suggests a direction for future research. However, if the parameters
of the stage game are not constant through time (e.g., number of buyers, market supply)
then this problem could be quite complex. Nonetheless, the static game considered here,
and the HOF allocation rule, could provide guidance.
Throughout the paper we have assumed that market supply is fixed. This was motivated
by examples from agriculture and regulated natural resources. Various complications arise
if we relax this assumption and allow supply to be sensitive to price. In particular, carefully
defined rationing rules become essential. The simplest extension of the HOF rule would
state that the firm with the highest offer buys its full desired quantity at that price. But
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with upward sloping supply, consider what happens when a buyer raises its price to become
the high offer firm. Not only does this firm attract supply to itself, it also causes supply to
increase for the entire market. If this firm's demand is not sufficient to absorb the increase
in market supply, then some of the suppliers will have to settle for a lower price. It becomes
necessary to have a rationing rule for suppliers to complement the HOF rule. The interactions
between rationing/allocation rules on the two sides of the market could yield quite interesting
results in the analysis of oligopsony with price competition.
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Appendix
Proof of lelllllla 1
First we identify the set of all non-negative w values that satisfy (1) for a given n. Then
we analyze the behavior of this solution set as n varies.
Any w for which w

+ 8 ~ W(O)

satisfies (1) by default.

Next consider any w for which W(Q/n) ::; w+8 < W(O), and hence Q/n ~ Q(w+8) > O.
Then
RHS (1) >

l.

W(O)

w

W

+8

l.

w

min{Q(w + 8), Q(v)}dv
min{· .. }dv +

8Q(w + 8) +

W(O)
l.

l.W(O) rnin{· .. }dv
w+8

Q(v)dv

w+8

> 8Q(w + 8) + LHS (1).
Hence, any such w satisfies (1) with strict inequality.
Now consider any w for which w + 8 < W(Q/n), and hence Q(w

+ 8) >

Q/n. In this

case, the following is true:
mill{Q,Q(W+cS)}

LHS (1)

fno

[W(~)

mill{Q/n,Q(w+cS)}

fno
RHS (1)

l.

w +cS

w
_

[.. .]£L; +

=

l

_

-

min{Q/n, Q(v)}dv +
rmill{Q/n,Q(w+cS)}

mill{Q,Q(w+cS)}

_

lmill{Q,Q(w+cS)}

[.. ·]d~

Q/n

8Q/n + 10
LHS (1) - RHS (1)

8]d~

- w -

[W(~)

l.W(O)rnin{Q/n, Q(v)}dv
w~

[W(~) - w - 8]£L;
-

- w - 8]£L; - 8Q/n.

Q/n

The last expression above is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of w, and it
approaches -8Q/n as w approaches W(Q/n) - 8.
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If we put the pieces together, it follows that (1) is satisfied for all w in some interval

[w;, W(O)]. If 8 ~ W(O) or if 8 ~ W(Q/n) (i.e., Q(8) ::; Q/n) then w; = O. Otherwise,

o ::; w;

< W(Q/n) - 8.

w;.

The remainder of the proof analyzes the effect. of n on

If w; > 0 then the previous

results yield

!c

min{Q,Q(W;;- +8)}

_

[W(~)

Q/n

-

w;: -

8]d~

-

- 8Q/n

=

O.

From this equality it follows that

!c

min{Q,Q(W;;- +8)}

_

[W(~)

Q/(n+l)

-

w;: -

8]d~

-

- 8Q/(n + 1) > O.

In words, if w remains equal to w; but the number of firms increases to n + 1, then (1) fails
to be satisfied. Hence w; ¢ [W;+l' W(O)], or equivalently, w; < w~+l'
Finally, if 8 < W(O) then for n sufficiently large w; > 0 (i.e., w = 0 fails to satisfy (1))
since LHS (l)lw=o > 0 = limn--too RHS (l)lw=o.

Thus, for n sufficiently large

w;

IS

an

increasing function of n and it satisfies (1) with equality:

l_

W~

-

min{Q, Q(v)}dv = lW~_
min{Q/n, Q(v)}dv.

w n +8

As n

--t

00

./

Wn

the LHS of this equation converges monotonically to
rW(O)

-

JIimn-<>oo

w;;- +6 min{ Q , Q (v) }dv

while the RHS converges monotonically to O. Therefore, limn--too w; = W(O) - 8 . •
Proof of lemma 2
For the sake of clarity it will be convenient to emphasize that

q in (3)

is a function of w

and n: q(w, n).
Since Q - (n - l)Q(w) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of w, it follows
that q(w, n) is a continuous and non-decreasing function of w. Therefore, the LHS of (2) is a
continuous and non-decreasing function of w. The RHS of (2) is a continuously differentiable
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and strictly decreasing function of w. Thus, if (2) fails to hold when w
to hold for any w

~

O. If it holds with equality when w

=

0 then it will fail

0 then it is satisfied only when

=

w = O. If it holds with strict inequality when w = 0 then it is satisfied on a non-degenerate

closed interval with left endpoint at O.
When w
Joii(O,n)

=

0 the RRS of (2) equals

Jomin{Q/n,Q(O)}

W(~)d~, while the LHS of (2) equals

W(~)~ since min{ q(O, n), Q(O)} = q(O, n) by (3). Hence, at w = 0, (2) is just satisfied

(satisfied strictly) if and only if q(O,n)

Q ~ nQ(O) then min{ Q/n, Q(O)}

min{Q/n,Q(O)} (q(O,n) < min{Q/n,Q(O)}). If

Q(O) and also q(O, n)

=

then (2) is satisfied if and only if w

=

=

=

Q(O) by (3). So if Q ~ nQ(O)

O. Alternatively, if Q < nQ(O) then Q - (n -l)Q(O) <

Q/n so q(O, n) = max{O, Q - (n - l)Q(O)} < Q/n = min{Q/n, Q(O)}. In this case (2) is
satisfied if and only if w E [0, w~] for some

w~

> O.

The proof will be complete if w~ < W(O). Observe that q(W(O), n) = min{Q, Q(O)} so
at w = W(O) the LHS of (2) is strictly positive while the RRS is O. Therefore W(O) (j. [0, w~],
which yields

w~

< W(O). •
/

Proof of lemma 3

Consider any w ~ 0 that satisfies Q (w) ~ Q/ n. By hypothesis, any such w must actually
be strictly positive. Since Q(w) ~ Q/n implies Q - (n - l)Q(w) ~ Q(w), (3) yields the
following: q(w, n)

=

min{Q - (n - l)Q(w), Q(O)} ~ Q(w). Thus,
rW(O)

LHS (2)

> io
>

rW(O)

iw

min{Q(w), Q(v)}dv
min{Q(w), Q(v)}dv

rW(O)

iw

Q(v)dv

RHS (2)
where the last line follows from the fact that if v E [w, W(O)] and Q(w) < Q/n then
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Q(v) = min{ Q/n, Q(v)}. Therefore, any such w fails to satisfy (2). Since w~ does satisfy (2),
it must be the case that Q(w~) > Q/n.
Now consider any w that satisfies Q(w) 2:: Q/(n -1). Then q(w, n) = 0, so LHS (2) = O.
Since Q(w) > 0 (and hence w < W(O)), RES (2) > O. Therefore, any such w satisfies (2)
with strict inequality. From the proof of lemma 2,

w~

satisfies (2) with equality. It follows

that Q(w~) < Q/(n - 1). _
Proof of corollary 4
Since any symmetric equilibrium price w must satisfy (2), it follows from lemma 2 that

w ~ w~. Then lemma 3 yields w < W(Q/n). Finally, according to the HOF rule, q =
min{Q/n,Q(w)} = Q/n. _
Proof of lemma 5
From the proof of lemma 2, W:+l satisfies (2) with equality. Also, since W~+l < W(O),
RES (2)lw=w~+1 is strictly positive. Hence q(w:+ 1 , n+ 1) > O. (More generally, q(w;!;" m) > 0
for any integer m ~ 2.) From lemma 3,
q(w~, n

+ 1)

Q-

(n

+1-

l)Q(w~)

= O. In addition, from the proof of lemma 2,

function of w. Since this function equals zero when w =

< O. Therefore, (3) yields

q(w, n + 1) is a non-decreasing

w~

and it is strictly positive when

Now {w:}~=2 is a monotone sequence that is bounded from above by W(O). In order to
prove that limn-+ex>

w:

=

W (0), it is sufficient to show that for all

w< W (0) there exists n

such that w: > w. So consider any w < W(O). By (3), there exists n sufficiently large such
that q(w, n) = O. From the previous paragraph q(w~, n) > O. Also, recall that q(., n) is a
non-decreasing function of its first argument. This yields

w~

> w .•

Proof of proposition 6
(a) If

Q ~ nQ(O)

or if 8 2:: W(O) then from lemma 1, w;; = 0, in which case the set

of symmetric equilibrium prices is the intersection of [0, w~] and the price grid. If
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8

~

If

Q ~ nQ(O)

W(O) then this intersection consists of only

only w

then from lemma 2,

w:

=

w

=

0 since

w: < W(O) (lemma 2).

0, so once again the intersection consists of

= O.

(b) Any half-open interval in IR+ of length 8 must contain exactly one point that lies on
the price grid. Therefore, since W(O) - b > 0, [W(O) - 8, W(O)) must contain exactly
one such point. Let w* denote this point. From lemma 1, there exists Nl such that if
n ~ Nl then w* - 8

< w;;' < W(O) - 8 :::; w*. From lemma 5, there exists N2 such that

ifn ~ N2 thenw* < w: < W(O). Let N

=

max{N1 ,N2}. Ifn ~ Nthenw* E [w;;.,w:J

and hence w* is a symmetric equilibrium price. Uniqueness follows since the adjacent
points on the price grid, namely w* - 8 and w*
greater than

+ 8,

are respectively less than w;;' and

w: .•

/
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Figure 1. Offer Price Increase
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Figure 2. Offer Price Decrease
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